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"No one laments more sincerely than I do the loss of our influence upon the Continent; but, if I were "called upon to say what would have the greatest effect in restoring our influence upon the Continent, I "would say, that it would be the giving back to France her colonial possessions. Let her commerce be "revived; let her colonies flourish, and our interests will proportionally increase."—LORD CASTLEREAGH'S Speech, 13th of May, 1802.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

NAVAL VICTORIES.—The very brilliant action and success of SIR RICH. STRACHAN, the official account of which will be found in another part of this sheet, has made a considerable addition to the advantage and the glory, acquired by the hero, whose death has filled the nation with mourning.—Upon occasions like this, it were unnatural not, at first, to give way to our feelings; and, it may safely be said, that, generally speaking, feelings more honourable to a nation never were, upon any occasion, demonstrated. Having, however, expressed our joy and our sorrow (for, here, they have, unfortunately, been pretty equally mixed), it becomes us to listen to the voice of reason, and to inquire, whereunto these victories tend; for, here, as in most other cases, it is not the event, but the *consequence*, that is the object of greatest importance.—With such an inquiry before us, it is mortifying to be detained, though but for a moment, by the captiousness of the ministerial writers; yet, before we go an inch further, it is necessary to notice their conduct, their *factious* conduct, upon this occasion; an occasion, one might have hoped, in which all party animosities would have been suspended, at least. So far from this, however, the ministerial writers have made the victory of Trafalgar the subject of new disputes; and, so full, so overflowing, are they of the malice of their most malicious of all factions, that they have converted the eulogium due to the brave Nelson into a vehicle of an attack upon the character and the views of their political opponents. Upon the former of these topics, I allude to a paragraph in the SUN of the 8th instant, which concludes thus: "Those who "are in the daily habit of abusing every "branch of the present administration, will, "of course, allow them no *merit* for *these* "*exertions*" [having been before speaking of the great naval victories]. "Those who "make Mr. Pitt responsible for the *errors* "and failures of the Austrian *generals*, and "who censure him for measures over which "he had no controul, *will*, we have *no* "*doubt*, in the same spirit of candour, allow him and his colleagues no credit for "the most decisive and glorious victory ever "obtained by the British navy."——Why was this said? Why was this challenge thrown down? Why thus interrupt the harmony of the nation? Why disturb either their joy or their grief? Selfish faction! Were the people not to be suffered to praise Lord Nelson and his brave companions in arms, unless they also praised Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville? It is a wonder that a portion of the praise is not demanded for Mr. Trotter! But, what are "the *Opposition*" (for that is the phrase now) charged with, by way of anticipation? They are charged with *being about to refuse* to Mr. Pitt and his colleague any merit on account of the victory gained by Lord Nelson, though they have made Mr. Pitt responsible for the *errors* of the Austrian *generals*, over the appointment of whom and over whose movements he had no controul. In the first place, no one has, that I know of, ever attempted to make Mr. Pitt responsible for the *appointment* of the Austrian generals; nor has any one, the ministerial writers excepted, thus unqualifiedly accused the Austrian *generals* (including princes of the blood) with misconduct, most reasonable men being of opinion that such accusations should not proceed first from this country, and that all the exulting comparisons between the conduct of the Austrian armies and our fleets will, in all probability, tend to mischief. It was not for the *appointment* of the Austrian generals that "the Opposition" made Mr. Pitt responsible, that being a measure over which he could have no controul; but, the Opposition made him, now make him, and will hereafter make him, responsible, and, it is to be hoped, perfectly and in the true and useful sense of the word, responsible for having, by his measures of subsidy and others, *precipitated Austria into the war*, contrary to the advice, the clearly expressed advice and remonstrance of "the Opposition," by whom he was fully, and in open parliament, warned of the fatal consequences; cons-

quences which have already come to pass to nearly the extent, in which they were anticipated. For this it is that "the Opposition" make him responsible; and not for the appointment of general Mack.——But, returning to the ministerial "merits" of Lord Nelson's victory, what "controul" had Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville over the measures that produced it; unless, indeed, their claim of merit be founded upon their having forced Spain into the war by a seizure of her plate ships previous to a declaration, and having thereby *created* a combined fleet to fight with and to kill Lord Nelson: unless this should be urged as the foundation of their claim, it would be amusing enough to hear what sort of "controul" they had; what share they had, as to the event of the 21st of October. Did they order out the combined fleet? Did they give the orders for battle? No: but they *appointed* Lord Nelson! This is insinuated; but even a hireling writer dares not *say* it out. Lord Nelson, when Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville came into power, was in the chief command of the Mediterranean and the coast of Spain, to which he had been appointed by Lord St. Vincent; and, it is hardly possible for the nation to have forgotten, that one of the first of their acts was, to send out Sir John Orde (Lord Nelson's *senior*) to take the *chief* command. That Sir John Orde *came away* from that very station, which has recently witnessed the glorious fall of the hero, whom he was appointed to supercede, we all remember well; and *that circumstance* it was, and *no appointment by Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville*, that once more restored Lord Nelson to the chief command in that quarter; that let him loose from his *inferior* station, and that enabled him to fly to the rescue of our most valuable colonies, then exposed to the insults and the inroads of an enemy, whom there was not a fifth part of the force sufficient to check. Whether, if Sir John Orde had *remained* in his command, and if Lord Nelson had *continued shut up as his inferior*, or had, in disgust, demanded his recall; whether, in such case, the victory of the 21st of October would have been gained, there may, perhaps, be found persons of different opinions; but, as to the merit of first appointing and then restoring Lord Nelson to the command which enabled him to gain the battle of Trafalgar, no one can deny, that the former belongs to Mr. Addington and Lord St. Vincent, and that to the latter the exclusive claim remains with Sir John Orde, in the appointment of whom Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville have certainly a right to all the merit.——After all, however, how disgraceful it is to provoke discussions of this sort! How discouraging to commanders, to see, that their deeds of bravery, that their toils and their blood, are, by some men, thought little of, except as they can be made conducive to the selfish purposes of party politics! What a pang would the gallant Nelson have felt, if it had come athwart his mind, that he was, as these writers would have it, dying, not for England, but for the Pitts, the Melvilles, the Roses, and the Cannings! How dangerous must the promulgation of such notions always be, with respect to the people at home, as well as to our fleets and armies! What would be the consequence, the inevitable consequence, if it became a generally-adopted notion, that our soldiers and sailors were fighting to uphold the reputation and preserve the power, not of the country, but of the minister? No answer to this question is necessary. That the discussion should have been provoked by the ministerial prints every true friend of the country must regret: having been provoked, it could not, without a desertion from the cause of justice, be declined; and, I am not without hopes, that the effect of it may be to prevent similar provocations in future; for, evident it is, that they directly tend to the introduction of the spirit of party amongst the commanders of our fleets and armies.——The other passage, to which I have alluded, as converting the eulogium, due to Lord Nelson, into a vehicle of an attack upon the character and views of all those who oppose the ministry, is to be found in the COURIER of the 9th instant, and is as follows: "The mind feels a melancholy "pleasure in returning often to the contemplation of the characters of those whom it "has loved, honoured, and respected. Lord "Nelson was incontestibly the greatest "blessing that ever was conferred upon this "country; there was no alloy in his character; it was not narrowed nor deformed "by *party principles* or prejudices; it was "all pure *sterling loyalty*: he never made "use of his great name TO EMBARRASS "THE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT;" the hackneyed phrase, this last is, which these writers always make use of to express an opposition to the minister of the day; and, it is not altogether unnecessary to observe, that this same COURIER was most furiously opposed to Mr. Pitt, till it was *converted* about eighteen months ago. But, do these writers pretend, that all opposition to ministers ought to be styled *embarrassing the government?* Ought the opponents of the infamous Cabal, in the reign of Charles II. to be regarded as per-

sons who embarrassed the government? Would it have been just to prefer this charge against those members of parliament, who, with the Speaker at their head, pronounced, *in opposition to the wish and the vote of the minister*, Lord Melville to have been guilty of a gross violation of the law and a high breach of duty; and who, finally, though still persevering in the same opposition, carried the determination to impeach the said Lord of high crimes and misdemeanours? Ought this to have been called *embarrassing the government?* As to the character of Lord Nelson, I perceive, amongst those who are now loudest in his praise, some from whom, at his return from the Mediterranean, in 1801, he met with but a very cold reception. Nay; I do remember, that they did not refrain from pointing out the little spots in his character, and that they proceeded so far as to ridicule his exhibition of the constellation on his breast. Upon that occasion, I remember, that I reproved them for their ingratitude; that I bade them think only of his services; and that I reminded them, that the day might come, when, in the hour of their utmost need, they might have to lament that he was no more. A recurrence to these facts has not been sought by me; but, if the exalted character of this lamented commander be still made use of as the means of throwing out insinuations against the opponents of the Pitts and Dundases, I will, whatever disgrace it bring upon the parties and upon the news-paper press, extract, at full length, the articles to which I have referred.——True; Lord Nelson was a great blessing to his country: his character was not, it is very true, deformed by party principles: it was, we all feel, pure sterling loyalty. All this I most cordially agree to, and I *said* it, at a time when the ministerial writers were, at the very best, silent upon the subject. But, if we *begin* to describe him in negatives, it is injustice not to go on a little further than merely to say, that "he never made use of "his great name *to embarrass the operations* "*of government*." There are many other things which Lord Nelson never did. He never rose upon professions, which he set at nought the moment he had mounted the ladder. He never was a bawler for reform and economy, and never either a peculator, or a defender of peculators. He never applied to the purposes of corruption, any of the public money committed to his charge. Lord Nelson was ambitious, it is true; but his ambition was of the higher order, its gratification being always inseparable from the good of his country. Lord Nelson loved command; but, it was a command over men bent upon honourable deeds, and following him for the sake of glory; and not over a base and spiritless crew, held in obedience by avarice and fear.———In speaking of the probable *consequences* of these naval victories, we must not, if we should find them of less importance than they, at first glance, would appear, think, on that account, less of the deeds of any of those, by whom they have been obtained; nor must we, on the other hand, estimate the consequences according to the heroism of those deeds. The first thing necessary in such an inquiry, is, to form a correct notion as to what is, or ought to be, *the main object of the war*, in which we are engaged; and, having done that, to endeavour to ascertain the degree, in which the victory is likely to contribute towards the accomplishment of that object. It was said, at the outset of this contest, that *we were at war, because we could not be at peace*; but, it was necessary to go a step further, and say, *why* we could not be at peace; and, doubtless, the reason would have been found in the over-grown power and inordinate ambition of our enemy. The question now, therefore, is, in what degree will the glorious victory of Trafalgar tend to diminish that power, or to repress that ambition? In the preceding sheet, I shortly stated my opinion, that, though the victory was highly valuable as an acquisition *of glory*, it would not, in other respects, be of much importance; that great part of the enemy's loss consisted in Spanish ships and men, the ships and men of our friends; that this loss would, in all probability, tend to bend the Spaniards more submissively, and to bind them more firmly to France; that, as to the final result of the war, the victory would do little; and, I submitted to the reader, whether our defeated allies upon the Continent would not, instead of experiencing much satisfaction at the news, be tempted to exclaim: "this war "may be sport to you, but it is death to "us." The opinion thus given has attracted the attention of one of those wise and candid persons, who conduct the ministerial press. He inserts the statement in the SUN of the 12th instant, prefixing the following title and remarks. "MODERN PATRIOTISM. The "following article appeared in a public print "which gives a *Weekly Register* of whatever "may tend to *depress the hopes* of the pub-"lic, and throw a *gloom* over our national "prospects. We shall content ourselves "with merely inserting it, as we believe "there is hardly a man in the kingdom who "can think that it requires any comment, "or *attempt at refutation*." But, you are deceived, wise man! for, you may be as-

sured, that every one of your readers, and no one more than your humble admirer, not only requires of you an *attempt* at refutation, but a refutation itself; and we demand that refutation at your hands, upon pain, in case of default, of being pronounced a venomous slanderer. As to "*depressing the hopes*" of the public, this is the old charge preferred by the same print, while I was endeavouring to prevent the delusive hopes of a continuation of peace from lulling the nation into a state of false security. The reader will remember the cuckoo cry of that time, and will not be much surprized to hear it now revived; but, I trust, that, as I do, so he will, most heartily despise it.——In speaking of the Spaniards rather as *our friends* than as the friends of France, I proceeded partly upon the information given in this very news-paper, the Sun, which, as will be seen by referring to the Register of the 28th of September last, p. 491, represents the *discontents* of the Spaniards as being universal, and as arising from their consciousness of having been *forced* into the war merely *to gratify the ambition of Buonaparté*. If this were true, and there is every reason to believe that it was so in part at least, we cannot regard the Spaniards as being, at bottom, our enemies; and, I think, it will not be denied, that the battle of Trafalgar is likely to have the effect of bending them more submissively and of binding them more firmly to France. This was, and this is, my opinion; and, whatever the wise men of the Sun may think of it, it will stand in need of something like reasoning to show that it is destitute of foundation; and it is not, in the slightest degree, to be impaired by his insinuations or assertions.——The main object of the war being to *diminish the power* of France, I ask the reader, whether, upon a calm consideration as to the nature of that power, he can discover *how* it is to be materially, if at all, affected by any naval combat whatever? In the discussions, relative to the peace of Amiens, the ministers and their friends promised us long tranquillity and security, upon the ground, that it would require many, many years, before France would be able to meet us at sea. She has not been able to meet us there yet, with any chance of success. But, have we been, ever since the peace of Amiens, *tranquil* and *secure?* During the last war, we gained naval victories enough; we were satiated with naval glory; the people, Lord Hawkesbury said, were weary even of victory, and Sir Henry Mildmay, in his speech of the 6th or 7th of May, 1802, asserted, that we had "annihilated the whole of the French marine." Did we, however, derive security from this source? Were our naval victories, great and glorious as they were, *decisive* as to the main object of the war? Did they prevent the prostration of the Continent at the feet of our enemy? Did they enable us to make conditions for our allies? Let Portugal, the House of Orange, or the King of Sardinia answer this question. Did our naval victories enable us to hold one inch of the vast extent of dominion, which we had, by the means of our navy, conquered from France? Nay, did they prevent us from tacitly surrendering the honour of our maritime flag; an honour enjoyed from the time that England was first called England down to the year 1801? If such, then, if so inefficacious, as to the main object of the war, our naval victories were during the last contest, at the beginning of which the commerce of France was very extensive, and her colonies uncommonly flourishing, what reason have we to expect, that, in this contest, France having, comparatively, scarcely any colonial prosperity, or commerce to lose, such victories will prove of any material consequence as to the final result? Naval victories, we are told, will give us *security at home*; will lessen the danger of invasion. That they will, for the present, I am happy in being convinced; though it is not very consistent in those to express this opinion, who daily assured us, that the French were actually coming, long before the war with Spain broke out, and at a time when they also assured us (and with truth), that there was not a French man of war that dared to venture from beneath its protecting battery. The invasion of England by the troops of France has always appeared to me as a very difficult and dangerous enterprise, unless the Channel were clear of our men of war. There are, however, two opinions upon the subject; and, at any rate, the menace of invasion, accompanied with great preparations, will, the enemy knows, always keep us in a state of alarm, and compel us to support, not one, but many fleets, together with all the burdens of a war-expenditure. Will naval victories, unless they could reach the boats in all the ports of France, prevent these effects of the menace and preparations of the enemy? Suppose the war upon the Continent to be at an end, and the French army returned to Boulogne; I ask the reader if he believes, that we should think ourselves any more secure, than we were in the month of August last, when we were, from authority, positively assured, that the enemy was hourly expected to embark for our shores? If he answers in the negative, which, I think, he

will, I then ask him, whether he ought not to be cautious in indulging hopes too sanguine as to the effect of our naval victories upon the final result of the war? I ask him, whether to indulge such hopes be not to create a source of disappointment, and, besides, to expose himself and his country to all the dangers that may be expected to arise from *slackened exertions?* Nothing, I repeat it over and over again, is so dangerous to a nation, situated as we now are, as the indulgence of delusive hope, which, though it sometimes proceeds from a good, proceeds not unfrequently from a bad, disposition; and, greatly do I fear, that no small part of the confident and boasting language of the day would, upon strict inquiry, be found to arise from feelings widely different from that, which, if required, leads men to sacrifice property and life for the honour and independence of their country.——With regard to the effect, which our naval victories may have "in reviving the drooping spirit of our "allies," to use the words of the ministerial papers, there may be different opinions, and mine I shall freely express, in defiance of all the abuse that can be heaped upon me. We are told by the COURIER, in particular, that, in this respect, the recent victories will be of wonderful importance; and, the writer exultingly exclaims, "where will the "COURIER now look for his *ships, com-* "*merce*, and *colonies*;" alluding to a declaration of Buonaparté to the captive Austrian generals. So, then, the victories, which are to revive the spirit of our allies upon the Continent, and to give us weight there, are to prevent Buonaparté from having ships, commerce, and colonies; which opinion, I leave to be reconciled with that of the worthy Lord Castlereagh, as expressed, very clearly and fully, in the passage selected as a motto to the present sheet. His lordship was (though inconsistent with himself) perfectly right in his opinion. Buonaparté was laughing in his sleeve at the Germans. If he wanted commerce and colonies, he knows, that, strange as it may seem to the editor of the COURIER, he can gain them by battles won upon the dry land of Germany and Italy; but, as if we wished to aid him in the deception, we are boasting that we have frustrated his purpose; we are telling the Germans precisely what he could wish us to tell them, namely, that we are, upon the side of the sea, preventing him from pursuing that, which, if he were not obstructed in the pursuit, would withdraw him from conquests on the side of the land; and this is to comfort them, to raise their spirits, and to induce them to make further exertions and sacrifices in a common cause with us! ——But, we are told, that the powers of the Continent will *now*, and in consequence of these naval victories, be convinced, that it is *for them*, and not at all for ourselves, that we are aiding them in the present war. Upon this part of the subject we must quote a passage or two; for, it will be found very useful to contrast what is now said, by these writers, with what they have before said, and with what they will say again 'ere thirty Suns have passed over their heads. "If it be *permitted*" [says the Courier of the 7th instant] "to seek for alleviation of the general sor- "row" [yet they blame every one whose *joy* is not even clamorous] "we should find "it not only in the greatness of the victory, "superior even to the victory of the Nile, "but in the *seasonableness* of it. We trust "it will produce the same effect as that "victory, that it will animate and inspirit "the Continent. Whilst in another part of "Europe, within a few hours distance, a "General was *sealing his condemnation*, "in the surrender of his army without a "battle, a British Admiral was yielding his "life in the arms of victory, after having "*annihilated* with an inferior force the "fleet of the enemy. Whilst in another "part of Europe Buonaparté was demanding "Austria to assist him in procuring ships, "colonies, and commerce; whilst he was "telling his soldiers that they were fighting "against the allies of England, England "was fighting him and his allies, and beat- "ing them both." [These *allies* are the Spaniards, observe, whom these writers assured us, only a few weeks ago, were universally discontented at having been *forced* into the war against us by Buonaparté.] "Whilst the French were entering "Ulm after an inglorious conquest, the "shattered remnant of their ships were en- "tering Cadiz, after an irreparable defeat. "This victory will *animate the Continental* "*Powers*, because it will prove to them, (a "proof *we did not want*) that we *do not* "*entertain any apprehension for ourselves*; "that we are *secure of victory*, whenever "the French dare to quit their own shore; "and that our exertions against France are "less to ensure *our safety* than *to enable* "*the Continent to achieve theirs*."—Good! But let us hear the sequel from the same paper of the 9th instant. I beg the reader to mark it well; for, it will not be long before he will have to compare it with what will be said by the same writer.—"Buona- "parté had deluded some of the conti- "nental powers into an idea, that his arma-

" ments were solely against England, that " he had the means of coping with her by " sea, and that therefore he had the power " of invading her. This victory will *put* " *an end* to that delusion at once. His " constant cry has been ships, colonies, and " commerce. He may cry out, but where " can he get them. The Continent must " now be convinced, beyond the possibility " of a doubt, that *all his attempts to obtain* " *them must be fruitless*. This victory too, " proving that he has not the means to meet " us by sea, will increase the confidence of " the Continental Powers in our resources. " They will see that *we have no fear for* " *ourselves*; that we *do not wage war to* " *achieve our security*, but that we carry it " on upon the great principle, and for the " great purpose of *enabling the Continent* " *to achieve theirs*, and to resist that ambi- " tion which threatens to leave *them* no- " thing but the name and shadow of inde- " pendence. The Continent can no longer " be deluded with the idea, so industriously " inculcated by Buonaparté, that we wish to " rouse it to war, merely to employ Buona- " parté's arms *elsewhere than against this* " *country*. Of all the delusions he had " practised, this was the one upon which " he relied the most. We shall hear no " more neither of the Opposition *menace*, " that Bonaparte will come against us 'with " ten-fold fury and with ten-fold means.' " It is rather *unfortunate for them*, that at " the very time they were *boasting* of his " ten-fold means, *we* had made such a re- " duction in his means, as to cut off, at " one blow, twenty sail of the line."—— The first subject of remark here, is, the indecent, the malignant insinuation, that "THE OPPOSITION" will *lament*, that the enemy has been defeated; that the victories of Lord Nelson and Sir Richard Strachan are a *misfortune* to them; that their wishes and interests are in unison with those of Buonaparté; and, that, of course, they are traitors to their Sovereign and their country. But, this has always been the tone of the writers of the Pitt and Melville faction. If any one were to throw out such insinuations against the ministry, you should soon see his ears cropped close to his head. " The " Opposition *menace*." What was it? A fear expressed by the editor of the Morning Chronicle, that Buonaparté, having defeated the coalition upon the Continent, would come against England with ten-fold fury and with ten-fold means. Did no one else entertain a fear of this sort? Was it not very general? And did not this slanderous COURIER himself express similar apprehensions? " Under such circumstances," said he, after having described the first consequences of the defeat of the Austrians, " Austria will be compelled to accept such " terms of peace as the conqueror shall be " pleased to grant. Austria gone, her ar- " mies annihilated, Russia can do nothing " against France, and Prussia may be de- " terred from stirring; the war on the Con- " tinent will be at an end, *and the hordes* " *of French soldiery, inflamed by their suc-* " *cesses, will return to the coasts opposite* " *England, from whence invasion will be* " *attempted, if there ever was a serious de-* " *sign of attempting it.*" This is a passage to recur to, when we come to speak of our waging the present war, *not for ourselves!* Now, what difference is there in the apprehensions here expressed and those expressed by the Morning Chronicle? Are they not exactly the same in substance, though not in form? And, when it is recollected, that both writers expressed their apprehensions under the same political circumstances, and even on the same day, the reader will be at no loss to form a judgment of the character and views of the faction, to which the Courier has attached itself. How, with what face, can the editor of this paper, or the persons under whose controul he is, now call it an Opposition *boast*, that Buonaparté would return to Boulogne with ten-fold means, when he himself had, at the same time, expressed his fear that such would be the case? And, *who* are " the " Opposition," that Opposition, to which he dares thus to attribute friendship towards the enemies of their country? This opposition, to whom he audaciously ascribes a wish to see the country invaded, comprizes two-thirds of the *English* members of the House of Commons; all the ancient nobility of the kingdom; and, in short, almost every man in the country distinguished for talent united with integrity; an Opposition who are the *owners of the land that would be invaded!* Amongst the people, commonly so called, the Opposition consists of all those who disapprove of the conduct of Lord Melville, Mr. Trotter, and Mr. Pitt, relative to matters brought to light by the Tenth Report; all those who have sense enough to perceive the consequences of the taxing and funding system; and especially all those who do not think that their liberties are to be preserved by the minister's lending the public money without interest to members of parliament. Such is " the Opposition," to whom this impudent understrapper ascribes the wish of seeing their country invaded by an implacable enemy! Talk of " *dispiriting* lan-

"guage"! This is really dispiriting language: for, what must the enemy and the world think of us, if they believe the representations of this ministerial writer, and, of course, conclude, that one half, at least, of the nation rejoice at the successes of Buonaparte? What effect, too, must accusations of this sort have upon the people? What *must* be the consequence, if the support of the minister, be his character and conduct what it may, be identified with the support of the country? Mr. Pitt, indeed, may oppose a ministry, without exposing himself to the charge of entertaining treasonable wishes, and *his* writers may censure a ministry, that he wants to displace, without incurring the risk of a prosecution for seditions and dispiriting language! I will, in my next sheet, lay before the public a few of the passages, in which the character and conduct of Mr. Addington and his colleagues (almost the whole of whom are now in office), and the deplorable state of the country, were described by the Pitt writers, at the time that Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville were endeavouring to get into power. This is a subject that might have been buried in oblivion; but, since an opposition to ministry is represented as factious, seditions, and, by implication, even treasonable, it is proper to remind the public of the opposition language and conduct of Mr. Pitt and his adherents.——In returning to the consequences of the naval victory, the first thing that strikes us, in the remarks of the COURIER, is, that "the Continent must now "be convinced, beyond the possiblity of a "doubt, that all Buonaparté's attempts to "obtain ships, colonies, and commerce, will "be fruitless;" and, according to the opinion of Lord Castlereagh, this conviction is the very means, of all others, to render the Continent jealous of us! At the peace of Amiens, the commerce and colonies were given up to him; and the justification of the ministry was, that by so doing we should be likely to recover our due weight upon the Continent. Buonaparté is endeavouring, apparently, to make the Germans believe, that the great object of his ambition now is, to acquire ships, colonies, and commerce; and, the wise-men who write in defence of Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville's system, are kindly *aiding* those endeavours with all their might. They, too, say, that the Emperor of France really wants ships, colonies, and commerce; but, that he shall not have them; that *England will keep them all to herself*; and, the conclusion naturally is, that, checked in this pursuit, the ambitious Napoleon will push forward on the side of the land.——If this consequence of the naval victories should not inspire any very great degree of joy amongst our German allies, the contrast, with which they will find the intelligence of those victories seasoned, will not, one would imagine, tend to render it more palatable. For what, in the name of decency, in the name of that moderation and modesty for which Englishmen were formerly distinguished; for what were the misfortunes of the Austrians introduced here? Before the naval victories were heard of, the ministerial writers had abused the Austrian generals; had loudly censured the Austrian cabinet; and the Courier had, in a very intelligible way, represented our illustrious though unfortionate ally, the Emperor of Austria, to be what I shall now forbear to name. Was not that enough? Had there not been time to reflect on the impropriety, the injustice, the impolicy, of such reproaches, and at such a time too? Or, do these writers really imagine, that the Austrians are to be cheered and revived by a contrast of their misfortunes with our successes; and, a contrast, too, interlarded with such cutting reflections upon their conduct? If to exhibit a contrast was at all necessary, could no *other capitulating general* be found? No *other prince that had fled* before a superior French force? The Austrians will be able to point out such, I'll warrant them; and, let me ask, who need be surprized, if they should be disposed to retaliate, in some way or other?——But, the Continent is, it seems, to be animated, by "the proof *now* given "them (a proof that *we* did not want)" that we do not entertain any apprehension *for ourselves*; that *we* "are *secure of victory*, whenever the French dare attack us "at home; that we *do not wage war to achieve our own security*, but for the "purpose of *enabling them to achieve theirs*." Is this wise man sure, that the powers upon the Continent will see the thing in this light? Is he sure, that they will be convinced, that we shall never again feel any of those apprehensions, of which we gave such audible and visible signs, long before the French could send a man of war to sea? And, supposing them to imbibe this wonderful conviction, is the wise man quite sure, that it would animate them, and make them rely more firmly on the continuance of our co-operation? Has he received any certain information, that our continental allies regard us as more likely to be zealous in the war when we are in no danger from the power of the enemy, than when we are in great danger from his power? ——In this statement of the ministerial wri-

ters there are two things ever to be kept in mind. The one is, that *we* were perfectly secure, *without the naval victory*: the other, that we were, and still are, aiding in a war upon the Continent, *not for our own interest or security, but purely for the sake of the powers of the Continent.* It follows, then, that we derive no additional security from the naval victory; and that, the millions raised upon us for subsidies this year, are given away, and not expended for any purpose beneficial to us. Observe, that this is no opinion of mine; it is a fair and inevitable conclusion, drawn from the assertions of the writers, who are devoted to the ministry. ——But, the fact is, that these writers, true to the character of their sect, are hypocrites; hypocrites of the lowest cast. They believe not a word of what they say here; or they have, upon former occasions, most grossly belied their consciences. For, can the public have forgotten, with what exultation they hailed the continental war; and how anxious they were to convince their readers, that *that war*, caused by Mr. Pitt, had *put an end, at least for a while, to the dangers of invasion?* "Like the vast prepa-"rations of Caligula" (said they, after having spoken of Buonaparté's being called off by the Austrians and Russians), "the "mighty threats of Buonaparté are now "turned to his scorn. The design of in-"vasion, which, not long since, ministers "*knew* to be *seriously entertained*, appears "*now* to be, at least for a time, *completely* "*abandoned.*" [And this, observe, without any naval victory, and merely by the means of the sound of war upon the Continent.] "Having no longer 200,000 dis-"ciplined soldiers placed in a position, "from which they might pour in upon us, "in a few hours of favourable coincidence; "having the advantage of acting with allies, "*capable of engaging the vast armies that* "*were to be poured down upon us*, horde "after horde, 'till we should be consumed "even by continued victories, if we should "be fortunate enough to gain them; we "have *now* to congratulate ourselves, that "the time is arrived, when we can, with "effect, act on the offensive, and alarm the "threatener with invasion in our turn." And, yet, they have now the assurance to tell the readers, to whom this was addressed, that England stood in no need of a continental diversion; that we entertained no apprehension for ourselves; that we do not wage war to achieve *our* security, but to enable the powers of the Continent to achieve theirs! Nor, must we here forget to resort to the picture of our situation, as exhibited by these writers, after the defeat and capture of the Austrians, and, upon the supposition that the continental war might soon be at an end. "Austria gone, her "armies annihilated, Russia can do nothing "against France, and Prussia may be de-"terred from stirring; the war on *the Con-"tinent will be at an end*, and the hordes "of French soldery, inflamed by their suc-"cesses, will return to the coasts opposite "*England, from whence invasion will be* "*attempted*; *&c. &c.*" Yet have these same writers now the profligate assurance to pretend, that *we* never entertained *any apprehensions for ourselves*; and never stood in need of a diversion upon the Continent!—— For the reasons which will naturally suggest themselves to the readers of these comments, I am decidedly of opinion, that the powers, friendly to us upon the Continent, will receive but little animation from these naval victories. They will perceive, that our success, and especially our acquisition of additional naval glory, will vex the ambitious Napoleon, and will retard his operations against us; but, they will also perceive, that we shall by our naval exertions, produce very little, if any, effect in *their* favour. They have recently witnessed the inefficacy of maritime victories in deciding the fate of powers upon the Continent. The peace of Amiens, the Stadtholder, and the King of Sardinia, are constantly before their eyes; they well know, that the victory of Trafalgar, though purchased by the death of Nelson, will not prevent a single battalion of Frenchmen from crossing the Rhine or the Alps; and they are equally confident, that, if defeated in the field by Napoleon, they will not, in treating for peace, be suffered even to pronounce the name of England.—— Is there, besides, nothing, after all, of drawback, in the loss of Lord Nelson? That he was not, to England, of an importance equal to that of Napoleon to France, may be, perhaps, allowed; but, that his value was very great indeed, there will be nobody found to deny. Where shall we find a man to replace him? There may be men as able; many as brave; a few as much above all private considerations, as much devoted to glory, and who as much identify their glory with the real service of their country. But, where is there a man, who will have so much authority in the service, who can venture so much to act for himself, whose name will inspire so much confidence in those under him, and so much terror in his enemies? Am I asked: for what would you reserve him? What, after all, could he do but obtain victories over the enemy's fleets?

My answer is, that, according to all human probability, contests are in store for us, of far more importance than any that can happen at this moment; in which contests success, or failure, may decide the fate of the country, and where success or failure may themselves be decided by the difference of such a man as Lord Nelson compared with any one likely to be substituted in his room, particularly if we are to judge from what we have lately seen. The loss incurred in the death of Lord Nelson, certainly ought not to be cited as an article of charge against the ministers. They could do no otherwise than employ Lord Nelson; and, for that very reason, as they incur no blame for his death, they can claim no praise for his victory.——In concluding this article (the length of which will prevent me from offering some remarks that it was my wish to offer upon the recent intelligence from the Continent) I cannot refrain from returning, for a moment, to the malicious charge, referred against me by the Sun, of endeavouring to "*depress the* "*hopes* of the public, and to throw *a gloom* "over our national prospects." If those hopes are well founded; if those prospects be, in the eye of reason, bright; it is impossible for me, or any one else, really to depress the former or to throw a gloom over the latter. But, as was before observed, this is the hackneyed charge against all those who express their fears of the consequences of events, be they what they may, that happen during the administration of Mr. Pitt. It is for him, and not for the country, that the charge is made. If you apprehend evil, you are regarded as his accuser, rather than which you may be guilty of all the crimes that ever were heard of.—There is a pretty, cant phrase, in great vogue in the purlieus of Whitehall and St. James's Street, about "hoping for the best." Agreed: but, this phrase used to mean, hoping for the best that *reason teaches* us to hope for; and not for the best that our imaginations happen to furnish us with, which deserves no name better than that of a *wish*; between which and *hope* there is a great difference.——The following paragraph, from the ministerial papers of the 1st instant, may be cited as a happy specimen of their mode of "*hoping for the* "*best*," and "*keeping up the spirits* of the "nation." I quote my favourite print, the Courier.—"In the *mean time*" [having just been speculating upon the means of retrieving affairs in Germany, and completely overseeting the French Emperor:] "In the *mean time*, the attention of every "man is anxiously directed to the move-"ments of the Prussian Cabinet. Captain "Johnson, of the ship Venus, arrived at "Grimsby, from Tonningen, reported on "his arrival, that previous to his departure "from Tonningen it was stated, that the "Prussian army had been united to that of "Russia, which had marched and joined "the Austrians; that the three armies com-"bined had *completely surrounded those of* "*France*, over whom they obtained a vic-"tory, and *after retaking Ulm*, pursued "the enemy with every prospect of further "success. Captain Johnson was called up-"on to appear before the Mayor of Hull, "and *swear* to the report, as it prevailed "at Tonningen. He immediately *did so*, "and his affidavit was yesterday morning "received in town, from the *Collector of* "*the Customs* at Hull, by a Gentleman of "the *Custom-house* in London."—A most proper channel, through which to receive such an oath! Verily, the nation, to keep up whose spirits such means are resorted to, must be in a desperate way. Yet, if any one had, upon the spot, scouted this story, he would have been accused of depressing the hopes of the public.—I now take my leave of this subject, with just asking the reader, whether he can conceive any thing more dangerous, than to proclaim, at a moment like this, that *our* danger is now all over; that we are not fighting for *our own* security, but for that of the states upon the Continent; and, that, of course, the subsidies raised, and to be raised, upon us, are *to be expended for no purpose, beneficial to us?*

Botley, Thursday, }
14*th Nov.* 1805. }

PUBLIC PAPERS.

DISPUTE WITH AMERICA.——*Correspondence of Mr. King, with Lord Hawkesbury.* *(Concluded from p. 730)*

Downing-street, April 11, 1801.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th of last month, and to inform you that, in consequence of the representation contained in it, a letter has been written, by his Majesty's command, by his Grace the Duke of Portland, to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty: a copy of which letter I herewith enclose to you, for the information of the govt. of the U. States. HAWKESBURY.

Whitehall, 30th March, 1801.

MY LORD,—I transmit to your lordships herewith a copy of the decree of the Vice-Admiralty Court of Nassau, condemning the cargo of an American vessel going from the United States to a port in the Spanish colonies; and the said decree having been referred to the consideration of the King's advocate-general, your lordships will per-

ceive, from this report, an extract from which I enclose, that it is his opinion, that the sentence of the Vice-Admiralty Court is erroneous, and founded in a misapprehension or misapplication of the principles laid down in the decision of the High Court of Admiralty referred to, without attending to the limitation therein contained.—In order, therefore, to put a stop to the inconvenience arising from these erroneous sentences of the Vice Admiralty Courts, I have the honour to signify to your lordships the King's pleasure, that a communication of the doctrine laid down in the said report, should be immediately made by your lordships to the several judges presiding in them, setting forth what is held to be the law upon the subject by the superior tribunals, for their future guidance and direction. PORTLAND.

Extract of the Advocate General's Report, dated March 16, 1801.

I have the honour to report, that the sentence of the Vice Admiralty Court appears to me erroneous, and to be founded in a misapprehension or misapplication of the principles laid down in the decision of the Court of Admiralty referred to, without attending to the limitations therein contained.—The general principle respecting the colonial trade has, in the course of the present war, been to a certain degree relaxed in consideration of the present state of commerce. It is now distinctly understood, and it has been repeatedly so decided by the High Court of Appeal, that the produce of the colonies of the enemy may be imported by a neutral into his own country, and may be re-exported from thence even to the mother country of such colony; and, in like manner, the produce and manufactures of the mother-country may, in this circuitous mode, legally find their way to the colonies. The direct trade, however, between the mother country and her colonies, has not, I apprehend, been recognized as legal, either by his Majesty's government, or by his tribunals.—What is a direct trade, or what amounts to an intermediate importation into the neutral country, may sometimes be a question of some difficulty. A general definition of either, applicable to all cases, cannot well be laid down. The question must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. Perhaps the mere touching in the neutral country to take fresh clearances may properly be considered as a fraudulent evasion, and is, in effect, the direct trade; but the High Court of Admiralty has expressly decided (and I see no reason to expect that the Court of Appeal will vary the rules) that landing the goods and paying the duties in the neutral country, breaks the continuity of the voyage, and is such an importation as legalizes the trade, although the goods be re-shipped in the same vessel, and on account of the same neutral proprietors, and be forwarded for sale to the mother-country or the colony.

AUSTRIA AND BAVARIA.—*A true Statement of the Conduct of the Serene Elector Palatine of Bavaria, in answer to the "Historical Representation of the Events which have directed the Conduct of his Electoral Highness." (See p.* 609.*) From the Vienna Court Gazette of the* 16*th Oct.* 1805.

The Serene Elector Palatine has published an Historical Representation, in which he owns himself an ally of France, and declares war against Austria and Russia, excusing, by false allegations, the breach of promise he had made to the Roman Emperor, of ceding his troops to him. Not content with the indemnifications the Serene Elector had received by the conclusum of the empire of 27th April, 1803, he suffered himself, from ambition, to be drawn into secret engagements with France, which proved, on every occasion, to tend systematically to counteract Austria.—As his ambitious hopes rested principally upon the prospects of a fresh attack with which the Court of Vienna was menaced by France on every occasion, those gradual armaments which his Majesty was compelled to make from the preparations made by the Emperor Napoleon, became an object of the Serene Elector's attention. His first design was to raise a numerous army in Bavaria, and to hold it in readiness for the French Emperor. The quickness of the Austrian armament prevented the execution of that intention, and the Elector chose rather to hasten to go and join the French with all his troops, leaving his Bavarian and Suabian estates to their own fate, than to disappoint the expectation of the enemy of public tranquillity; consequently the whole of the Bavarian artillery was sent to Wurtzburgh, the Bavarian and Suabian troops were assembled, and a French general was present, to prepare every thing agreeably to the desire of the Emperor Napoleon. His Serene Highness the Elector had also prepared for his departure, when Prince Schwazenberg arrived at Munich, on the 6th of September.—The danger that the Elector Palatine would join the French was indubitable; consequently a serious demand for the cession of troops became a just measure of self-defence.—The Elector agreed to the demand verbally, and in writing. He wrote to the Prince, on the 7th of September, with his own hand: 'I am resolved; 'confer with the Minister Montgolas, on

'the conditions.' The minister confirmed his Sovereign's resolution, and proposed the conditions; that the Elector's own regiment, and that of the Electoral Prince, should remain at the disposal of his Serene Highness; and that Munich and Nymphenburgh should be exempted from the passage of Austrian troops. The agreement was to be concluded at Haag, on the following day. —On the 8th of September, Count Nogarola was sent off to the Emperor, with a letter from the Elector, beginning in the following words:—'I have this morning ordered my minister to conclude an agreement with Prince Schwarzenberg, in pursuance of which I shall unite my forces to those of your Imperial and Royal Majesty, to give you a proof of my inviolable devotion.' No sooner had Count Nogarola set off with this letter, and even before Prince Schwarzenberg could go from Munich to Haag, than the Serene Elector left Bavaria in the night of the 8th, and withdrew all his troops by forced marches, having emptied all the public chests, and taken with him even the deposited bonds, and widows' and orphans' estates; whence it became necessary to put a stop to the further drawing of annuities, &c. to prevent a total stagnation of the whole administration of the country.——When Prince Schwarzenberg and General Mack arrived at Haag, the Elector's intention of flying from his engagement was no longer secret. After they had waited a long while, there appeared a Palatine lieutenant-colonel, shewing, by his tone and proposals, quite different from those of Munich, that a pretence was sought for breaking off a nugatory negotiation. It was refused to leave the Electoral troops in Bavaria: their cession was to be deferred till the war had actually commenced, and they were always to remain together as a separate body.—After what had happened, the Austrian generals could not consent to leave an independent and numerous corps in the rear and flank of the Austrian army, which was hastening forward.—The Bavarian troops were not to be embodied by men or companies with the Austrians, as has been falsely asserted in the Palatinate part, but to remain together, in whole regiments or brigades. The entry of the Austrian and Russian troops in Germany had been notified to the Serene Elector, who had only made the exception of the districts of Munich and Nymphenburgh.—As to the requisitions made for the maintenance of the Austrian troops, they are become indispensible, from the general practice of the French army, as no other power could otherwise cope with it. However, since the entry of the French, the vast difference between their mode of raising requisitions, and the Austrian, has been experienced.—Nevertheless, to remove every pretence, his Majesty declared by his envoy, Count Buol, that he accepted the condition of leaving the Palatine troops together in a separate corps. The objection stated in the Serene Elector's letter of September 8th, namely, that the Electoral Prince was in France, was already removed, by the wise precaution of the Prince. Count Buol was even empowered to be finally satisfied with the dismissal (instead of the cession) of the troops, by the way of furlough, or even of the Bavarian troops alone.—All was refused. The French troops were received by the Elector with open arms, and all the Palatine troops joined them. They take the field against his Majesty, and against the Emperor of Russia, and war has been declared.—In a word, the Elector became false to his word, which he had given as a Prince, and as a man; false to his people, and to his Emperor; to the proved friendship of the Emperor Alexander; to the security and welfare of Germany, and of Europe, which depend on the event of this war compelled by France. This is the true statement of a conduct, which the loyal subjects of that Prince loudly deprecate, at which the honourable and patriotic feelings of his brave troops revolt, who are now shedding their blood, not for the deliverance of Germany, but for its enemies, and who are compelled to stain their hands with German blood.

Proclamation of the Elector of Bavaria to the Bavarians, dated Wurtzburgh, Oct. 10, 1805.

BAVARIANS,—At the moment when I was solely intent upon your prosperity, when I foresaw no danger, I have been forcibly separated from you. Austria, for the preservation of which the generous blood of Bavarians has so often flowed, had conceived perfidious plans against you, and against me. She demanded, with threats, that your sons, my brave soldiers, should be distributed among the Austrian army, and combat against a power, which has, at all times, protected the independence of Bavaria.—Thus the Bavarians were not to fight for their country, but for foreign interests; thus the very name of the Bavarian army was to be destroyed.—My duty, as a Prince, and as the father of an independent and faithful people, has induced me to reject propositions so dishonourable to the nation, and to maintain, with firmness, the neutrality of my states.—I still flattered myself that I should see my ardent wish accomplished, in the repose of the country. The negociations upon

this subject were not yet broken off, when Austria, faithful to the system of annihilating the independence of Bavaria, violated the most sacred treaties, passed the Inn with her army, and treated you as the inhabitants of a conquered country. The most burthensome requisitions were made. You were deprived of the instruments the most necessary to your industry, even those of your agriculture. Your fields were laid waste; your cattle were carried forcibly away; you were inundated with a depreciated paper money; even a great number of your sons were forced to serve under the colours of Austria. After an invasion so perfidious, after outrages so unheard of, it became my dignity, as a Prince and protector of the nation, to take up arms, and to deliver the country from its oppressors.—The Emperor of the French, the natural ally of Bavaria, flies to your succour with his intrepid warriors. He comes to avenge us. Already your brothers and your sons fight in the ranks of these heroes, habituated to victory; and, already, we see the dawn of our safety.—— Bavarians! You, who patiently bear the evils which the enemies of the country heap upon you, remember your Prince, who knows your sufferings, who shares them; and who cannot support the idea of being separated from you, but in the persuasion, that, by preserving his personal liberty, he has secured to himself the means of acting with an absolute independence for his dear and faithful subjects.—Our good cause is under the protection of a just God, and of a courageous army, commanded by an invincible hero! Let the rallying word of every Bavarian be, "for his Prince and his country!"

(Signed) MAX. JOSEPH, Elector.

PRUSSIA AND FRANCE.—*Note transmitted by the Prussian Minister, Baron de Hardenberg, to M. Duroc and M. Laforest. Dated Berlin, Oct.* 14, 1805.

The King has commanded me to communicate what follows to his Excellency Marshal Duroc, and to M. Laforest, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of the French: —His Majesty is uncertain, whether he should be more surprised at the outrages which the French armies have taken the liberty of committing in his provinces, or at the extraordinary arguments by which it is attempted, at this day, to justify them. Prussia had declared her neutrality; but, adhering to the last to her prior engagements, all the advantages of which henceforth would be in favour of France, she made sacrifices to them which might have endangered her dearest interests. This invariable integrity, this connexion, which, without being in the least degree expensive to France, produced to her an invaluable degree of security on many essential points; how has it been repaid? Justly jealous of that consideration, which is no less due to his power than to his quality, the King has read, with sensations which he has in vain endeavoured to suppress, the justificatory dispatch communicated by the French ambassador to his cabinet.—A justification is attempted upon the authority of the practice of the last wars, and the similarity of circumstances; as if the exceptions which were then admitted had not been founded upon positive acts, which have been since annulled by the peace; as if the Emperor ever took those acts into his consideration, when he took possession of the country of Hanover, of a country that had been so long placed under the protection of Prussia! But ignorance of our intentions is pleaded, as if the intention did not exist in the nature of the transaction, so long as the contrary is not stipulated? As if the solemn protestations of the authorities of the province, and of the minister of his Majesty to his Highness the Elector of Bavaria, had not sufficiently made known what was by no means necessary, and that I myself, with the map in my hand, in the conferences which I had with their Excellencies M. Duroc and M. De Laforest, had not declared that no troops whatever should pass through the Margraviates, pointing out to them, at the same time, the route of communication, that Bavaria had stipulated for herself, as the only one in which the march of the troops was not likely to meet with any obstruction! It has been said, that in matters of such importance, a positive explanation should take place, as if that were a duty incumbent on the power which reposed in confidence on the faith of a principle, and not upon that which intended to subvert it. In short, a pretext is made of facts, which have never had any other foundation than in false reports: and in imputing outrages to the Austrians, which they have never committed; the observations of his Majesty are only directed to the contrast which their conduct offers to that of the French armies.—The King could have even drawn from this contrast, conclusions more unfavourable respecting the intentions of the Emperor. He will confine himself to the reflection, that his Imperial Majesty had, at least, his reasons for considering the positive engagements which existed between him and Prussia, as of no importance in his eyes, under the present circumstances; and that he himself was consequently on the point of sacrificing every thing to adhere to his engagements. He

considers himself at this day absolved from all obligations antecedent to the present time. Thus restored to that state of things, in which he has no other duty than that of his own safety, and the maxims of common justice, the King will not the less evince, that he is always animated by the same principles.—To see Europe participate in that peace, in which he aspires to maintain his own subjects, is his only wish: to contribute, by all the means in his power, to re-establish it upon a solid basis, and to apply to this great work his active mediation, and his unremitting endeavours, shall be his chief duty.—But, impeded on every side, in these his noble intentions, the King can no longer entrust to other hands than his own the care of providing for the safety of his people. Without obligations for the future, and also without assurances, he finds himself compelled to order his armies to occupy those positions which are indispensably necessary for the protection of the state.—Entreating their Excellencies M. Duroc and M. De Laforest to transmit these observations to his Imperial Majesty, I have to assure them of my high consideration. (Signed) HARDENBERG.

CONTINENTAL WAR.—*Twelfth Bulletin of the Grand Army, from the French Official Paper the Moniteur, dated Paris, Nov. 1, 1805.*

Munich, Oct 27.—To the fifth bulletin of the army should be annexed the capitulation of Memmingen, which was forgotten. The works at the fortifications of Ingolstadt and Augsburg, are, at this moment, carried on with the greatest activity. Têtes de Pont are constructed at all the bridges over the Lech, and magazines are established on the latter. His Majesty has been highly satisfied with the zeal and activity of his aid-de-camp, General Bertrand, whom he has frequently employed in reconnoitring. His Majesty has given directions for the demolition of the fortifications of Ulm and Memmingen.—The Elector of Bavaria is every moment expected here. The Emperor has sent his aide-de-camp, Colonel Lebrun, to receive him, and to afford him, on his rout, escorts of honour. Te Deum has been performed at Augsburg and at Munich. The subjoined proclamation has been posted up in all the towns of Bavaria. The people of that country are well affected; they run to arms, and form voluntary guards for the defence of their country, against the incursions of the Cossacks. Generals Deroi and Wreden manifest the utmost activity; the latter has taken a great number of Austrian prisoners. He served, during the last war, in the Austrian army, in which he distinguished himself.—General Mack, having travelled post through Bavaria, on his return to Vienna, met General Wreden, at the advanced posts, near the Inn. They had a long conversation on the manner in which the Bavarian army is treated by the French. "We fare much better than with you;" said General Wreden; "we are subjected neither to mortification nor ill-treatment; and so far from being exposed the most, we are obliged to demand posts of danger, because the French reserve them for themselves, in preference. With you, on the contrary, we were sent to every quarter where there was a bad business to retrieve."—A staff officer has just arrived from the army of Italy. The campaign began on the 18th of October. That army will soon form the right of the grand army.—The Emperor, yesterday, gave a concert to all the ladies of the court. He gave a particularly distinguished reception to Madame de Montgelas, the wife of the Elector's prime minister, a lady of extraordinary beauty. He testified his satisfaction to M. de Wintz, master of music to the Elector, on the excellent composition of his pieces, replete with spirit and talent.—This day, Sunday, October 27, the Emperor attended mass in the Chapel of the Palace. The following are the names of the Austrian generals taken prisoners. The number of officers is between 1,500 and 2,000. Every officer has signed his parole of honour not to serve; it is hoped, that they will punctually keep it; if not, the laws of war will be enforced with the utmost rigour.

List of Austrian general officers taken prisoners in the actions of Elchingen, Wertingen, Memmingen, Ulm, &c.: Baron Mack, Field-Marshal-Lieut., Quarter-Master-General. Prince de Hesse-Hombourg, Field-Marshal-Lieut.; Baron de Hipschis, ditto; Count de Giulay, ditto, Quarter-Master-General of the army of Prince Ferdinand; Baron de Landon, ditto; Count de Klenau, ditto; Count de Gottescheim, ditto; Count de Riese, ditto; Count Baillier, ditto; Comte de Werneck, ditto; Prince de Hohenzollern, ditto.—Prince de Lichtenstein, General-Major; Baron de Abel, ditto; Baron de Ulm, ditto; Baron de Weidenfeld, ditto; Count de Gelmeddy, ditto; Count de Fremel, ditto; Count de Stieker, ditto; Count de Hermann, ditto, prisoner at Elchingen; Count de Hermann, ditto, prisoner at Ulm; Count de Reichter, ditto; Count de Diexersberg, ditto.—Count de Mitxery, General; Count de Wogel, ditto; Count de Weiber, ditto; Count de Hohenfeld, ditto; Baron d'Aspre, ditto; Count de Spangen, ditto.

Capitulation of the Garrison of Memmingen. October 14, 1805.

The General of Division Saligny, Chief of the staff of the 4th Corps of the Grand Army, in the name of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, and acting under the orders of his Excellency, Mareschal Soult, and the Count de Spangen, Major-General, and commanding at Memmingen, have entered into the following Capitulation: Art. 1. The Austrian garrison of Memmingen surrender themselves Prisoners of War to the 4th Corps of the Grand Army, commanded by his Excellency Mareschal Soult. 2. The Garrison shall march out with the honours of war. 3. The Officers shall be at liberty to return to their homes, on giving their parole of honour not to serve till they have been exchanged, rank for rank, or to share the same fate as their troops. 4. The Officers shall keep their arms, their horses, and their equipages; the subalterns and soldiers all their accoutrements. 5. The non-combatants, such as the surgeons, physicians, chaplains, smiths, and musicians, shall be set at liberty. 6. All the papers relative to the place, or to the Austrian army, shall be delivered to the Chief of the Staff of the French army. 7. All the artillery, ammunition, and provisions, all the horses of every kind, shall be given up to the French army, according to the situation of the place. 8. His Excellency the Marshal promises, with pleasure, to cause the same attention to be paid to the sick, as to the sick of the French army. 9. Carriages shall be provided for the removal of the effects of the Officers. Done in presence of General Sebastiani, Colonel Fitteau, and the principal Officers of the place. (Signed) The General of Division, Saligny, General Horace Sebastiani, M. Fitteau, Col. of the 3d reg. of dragoons, Count de Spangen, Major-General, Wouvermans, Colonel, Baron de Lauer, Major and Engineer.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

NAVAL VICTORY.—*From the London Gazette Extraordinary; dated Admiralty Office, November* 11, 1805.

The letter (and its enclosures), of which the following are copies, were received at this office last night, from Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Sir Richard John Strachan, Bart. commander of his Majesty's ship Cæsar, addressed to W. Marsden, Esq.

Cæsar, November 7, 1805.

SIR,—The accompanying copy of a letter, addressed to the Hon. Admiral Cornwallis, I request you will be pleased to lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, with my apology for the hasty manner in which it is written. I have the honour, &c.

R. J. STRACHAN.

Cæsar, West of Rochfort 264 miles, Nov. 4, 1805, wind S. E.

SIR,—Being off Ferrol, working to the westward, with the wind westerly, on the evening of the 2d, we observed a frigate in the N. W. making signals; made all sail to join her before night, and followed by the ships named in the margin *, we came up with her at 11 at night; and at the moment she joined us, we saw 6 large ships near us. Capt. Baker informed me he had been chaced by the Rochefort squadron, then close to leeward of us. We were delighted. I desired him to tell the captains of the ships of the line astern to follow me, as I meant to engage them directly; and immediately bore away in the Cæsar for the purpose, making all the signals I could, to indicate our movements to our ships; the moon enabled us to see the enemy bear away in a line abreast, closely formed; but we lost sight of them when it set, and I was obliged to reduce our sails, the Hero, Courageux, and Æolus being the only ships we could see. We continued steering to the E.N.E. all night, and in the morning observed the Santa Margaritta near us; at nine we discovered the enemy of 4 sail of the line in the N. E. under all sail. We had also every thing set, and came up with them fast; in the evening we observed 3 sail astern; and the Phœnix spoke me at night. I found that active officer, Capt. Baker, had delivered my orders, and I sent him on to assist the Santa Margirita in leading us up to the enemy. At day-light we were near them, and the Santa Margarita had begun in a very gallant manner to fire upon their rear, and was soon joined by the Phœnix.—A little before noon, the French finding an action unavoidable, began to take in their small sails, and form in a line, bearing on the starboard tack; we did the same; and I communicated my intentions by hailing to the captains, "that I should attack the centre and rear," and at noon began the battle; in a short time the van ship of the enemy tacked, which almost directly made the action close and general; the Namur joined soon after we tacked, which we did as soon as we could get the ships round, and I directed her, by signal, to engage the van; at half-past three the action ceased, the enemy having fought to admiration, and not surrendering

* Cæsar, Hero, Courageux, and Namur, Bellona, Æolus, Santa Margarita, far to leeward in the South-East.

till their ships were unmanageable. I have returned thanks to the captains of the ships of the line and the frigates, and they speak in high terms of approbation of their respective officers and ships' companies. If any thing could add to the good opinion I had already formed of the officers and crew of the Cæsar, it is their gallant conduct in this day's battle. The enemy have suffered much, but our ships not more than is to be expected on these occasions. You may judge of my surprise, Sir, when I found the ships we had taken, were not the Rochfort squadron, but from Cadiz. I have the honour to be, &c. R. J. STRACHAN. To the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of the White, and Commander in Chief, &c. &c. &c.

First Line.—Starboard Tack. British Line—Cæsar, of 80 guns; Hero, of 74 guns; Courageux, of 74 guns.

French Line.—Duguay Trouin, of 74 guns, Capt. Touffet; Formidable, of 80 guns, Rear Admiral Dumanoir; Mont Blanc, of 74 guns, Capt. Villegrey; Scipion, of 74 guns, Capt. Barouger.

Second Line (when the Namur joined.)—Larboard Tack. British Line—Hero, of 74 guns, Hon. Capt. Gardner; Namur, of 74 guns, Capt. Halsted; Cæsar, of 80 guns, Sir R. J. Strachan; Courageux, of 74 guns, Capt. Lee.

French Line—Duguay Trouin, Formidable, Mont Blanc, and Scipion.—N.B. The Duguay Trouin and Scipion totally dismasted; the Formidable and Mont Blanc have their foremasts standing.—Our frigates—Santa Margarita, Æolus, Phœnix, and Revolutionaire.—The Revolutionaire joined at the time the Namur did, but, with the rest of our frigates, in consequence of the French tacking, were to leeward of the enemy. I do not know what is become of the Bellona, or the other two sail we saw on the night of the 2d inst. The reports of damage, killed, and wounded, have not been all received. The enemy have suffered much.

Admiralty Office, Nov. 11, 1805.—The names of the captains who commanded his Majesty's frigates in the late gallant action under Sir Richard Strachan, being omitted in the Gazette Extraordinary, it becomes necessary to state, that the Revolutionaire was commanded by Capt. H. Horham, the Phœnix by Capt. Baker, the Æolus by Capt. Lord William Fitzroy, and the Santa Margarita by Capt. Wilson Rathborne.

Admiralty Office, Nov. 12.—Copy of a letter from Rear Admiral Sir Richard John Strachan, Bart. to William Marsden, Esq. dated on board his Majesty's ship the Cæsar, off Falmouth, the 8th inst.

SIR,—Not having the returns when the Æolus left us, and now having occasion to send in the Santa Margarita to procure pilots to take the French ships into harbour, I transmit you the returns of killed and wounded in the action of the 4th; and also a copy of the thanks alluded to in my letter, which I request you will communicate to their lordships. I dare say their lordships will be surprised, that we have lost so few men. I can only account for it from the enemy firing high, and we closing suddenly. I have the honour to be, &c. R. J. STRACHAN.

I have as yet no very correct account of the loss of the enemy, or of their number of men. The Mont Blanc had 700; 63 killed, and 96 wounded, mostly dangerous. The Scipion, 111 killed and wounded. The French Admiral Mons. Dumanoir le Pelley, wounded; the Capt. of the Duguay Trouin, killed; and second captain wounded.

A list of killed and wounded in his Majesty's ships under-mentioned, in action with a French squadron on the 4th of November, 1805.

Cæsar—4 killed, and 25 wounded. Hero—10 killed, and 51 wounded. Courageux—1 killed, and 13 wounded. Namur—4 killed, and 8 wounded. Santa Margarita—1 killed, and 1 wounded. Revolutionaire—2 killed, and 6 wounded. Phœnix—2 killed, and 4 wounded. Æolus—3 wounded. Total—24 killed, and 111 wounded—135.

Officers killed—Hero—Mr. Morrison, second lieut. of marines. Santa Margarita—Mr. T. Edwards, boatswain.

Officers wounded—Hero—Lieut. Shekel; Mr. Titterton, and Mr. Stephenson, second lieutenants of marines. Courageux—Mr. R. Clephane, first lieut.; Mr. Daws, master's mate; Mr. Bird, midshipman; and Mr. Austin gunner. Namur—William Clements, capt. of marines; Thomas Osborne, second lieut.; and Frederick Beasley, midshipman. (Signed) R. J. STRACHAN.

General Memorandum.—Cæsar, at Sea, November 6, 1805. Having returned thanks to Almighty God for the victory obtained over the French squadron, the senior captain begs to make his grateful acknowledgments for the support he has received from the ships of the line and the frigates; and requests the captains will do him the honour to accept his thanks, and communicate to their respective officers and ship's companies, how much he admires their zealous and gallant conduct. R. J. STRACHAN. To the respective captains and commanders.

ADMIRALS OF THE RED FLAG.—*From the*

London Gazette, dated Admiralty Office, Nov 9, 1805.

His Majesty having been pleased to order the rank of Admirals of the Red to be restored in his Majesty's navy, the following flag officers were this day promoted in pursuance of the King's pleasure, viz.—

Admirals of the White, to be Admirals of the Red.

Robert Roddam, Esq. Nicholas Vincent, Esq. R. Digby, Esq. Right Hon. Alexander Viscount Bridport, K. B. Sir C. Ogle, Knt. Right Hon. Samuel Viscount Hood, Sir R. Hughes, Bart. J. Elliot, Esq. Right Hon. William Lord Hotham, Right Hon. Charles Lord Barham, Sir R. King, Bart. Right Hon. John Earl St. Vincent. K. B. Phillips Cosby, Esq. S. Cornish, Esq. J. Brisbane, Esq. C. Wolsely, Esq. H. R. H. William Henry Duke of Clarence, Sir T. Onslow, Bart. Sir R. Kingsmill, Bart. Sir H. Parker, Knt. B. Caldwell, Esq. Hon. W. Cornwallis.

Admirals of the Blue, to be Admirals of the White.

C. Buckner, Esq. John Gell, Esq. Right Hon. Alan Lord Gardner, W. P. Williams, Esq. Sir T. Pasley, Bart. J. Cumming, Esq. Sir J. Colpoys, K. B. S. Lutwidge, Esq. G. Montagu, Esq. Right Hon. George Lord Keith, K. B. J. Pigott, Esq. Right Hon. W. Lord Radstock, T. Mackenzie, Esq. Sir R. Curtis, K. B. Sir H. Harvey, K. B.

Vice Admirals of the Red, to be Admirals of the Blue.

Isaac Prescott, Esq. J. Bazely, Esq. T. Spry, Esq. Sir J. Orde, K. B. W. Young, Esq. J. Gambier, Esq. Sir A. Mitchell, K. B. C. Chamberlayne, Esq. P. Rainier, Esq. P. Patton, Esq. Sir C. Morice Pole, Bart.

Vice Admirals of the White, to be Vice Admirals of the Red.

John Brown, Esq. J. L. Douglas, Esq. W. Swiney, Esq. C. E. Nugent, Esq. C. P. Hamilton, Esq. E. Dod, Esq. Sir C. Cotton, Bart. J. Thomas Esq. J. Brine, Esq. J. Pakenham, Esq. Sir E. Gower, Knt. J. Holloway, Esq.

Vice Admirals of the Blue, to be Vice Admirals of the Red.

G. Wilson, Esq. Sir C. H. Knowles, Bart. Hon. T. Pakenham, R. Deans, Esq. C. Collingwood, Esq.

Vice Admirals of the Blue, to be Vice-Admirals of the White.

J. H. Whitshed, Esq. A. Kempe, Esq. Smith Child, Esq. Right Hon. Charles Lord Lecale, T. Taylor, Esq. Sir J. T. Duckworth, K. B. Sir R. Calder, Bart.

Rear Admirals of the Red, to be Vice-Admirals of the White.

J. R. Dacres, Esq. Hon. G. Berkeley, T. West, Esq. J. Douglas, Esq. P. Aplin, Esq. H. Savage, Esq. B. S. Rowley, Esq. Sir R. Bickerton, K. B.

Rear Admirals of the Red, to be Vice Admirals of the Blue.

G. Bowen, Esq. R. Montagu, Esq. J. Ferguson, Esq. E. Edwards, Esq. Sir J. B. Warren, Bart. and K. B. E. T. Smith, Esq. Sir T. Graves, K. B. T. M. Russell, Esq. S. Moriarty, Esq. Sir H. Trollope, Knt. H. E. Stanhope, Esq. R. M'Donall, Esq.

Rear Admirals of the White, to be Vice Admirals of the Blue.

Billy Douglas, Esq. J. Wickey, Esq. J. Inglis, Esq. J. Fish, Esq. J. Knight, Esq. E. Thornbrough, Esq.

Rear Admirals of the White, to be Rear Admirals of the Red.

J. Kempthorne, Esq. S. Edwards, Esq. G. Campbell, Esq. H. Cromwell, Esq. A. Philip, Esq. Sir W. G. Fairfax, Knt. Sir J. Saumarez, Bart. and K. B. T. Drury, Esq. A. Bertie, Esq. Right Hon. William Earl of Northesk, J. Vashon, Esq. Sir W. H. Douglas, Bart. T. Wells, Esq. Sir E. Pellew, Bart. Sir I. Coffin, Bart.

Rear Admirals of the Blue, to be Rear Admirals of the Red.

J. Aylmer, Esq. S. Osborn, Esq. R. Roger, Esq.

Rear Admirals of the Blue, to be Rear Admirals of the White.

J. Faulknor, Esq. J. C. Purvis, Esq. T. Jones, Esq. W. Domett, Esq. W. Wolsley, Esq. J. Manley, Esq. G. Murray, Esq. J. Sutton, Esq. R. Murray, Esq. Hon. A. Cochrane, Sir T. Troubridge, Bart. J. Markham, Esq. C. Stirling, Esq. H. D'Esterre Darby, Esq. E. Bowater, Esq. G. Palmer, Esq. W. O'Brien Drury, Esq. W. Essington, Esq. T. Louis, Esq.

The under-mentioned Captains were also appointed Flag Officers of his Majesty's Fleet, viz. to be Rear Admirals of the Blue.

J. M'Dougall, Esq. J. Alms, Esq. E. Harvey, Esq. J. Peyton, Esq. Sir E. Nagle, Knt. J. Wells, Esq. R. Grindall, Esq. G. Martin, Esq. Sir A. J. Ball, Bart. Sir R. J. Strachan, Bart. Sir W. S. Smith, Knt. T. Sotheby, Esq. E. O'Bryen, Esq. N. Brunton, Esq. W. H. Kelly, Esq. J. Schank, Esq. Hon. M. De Courcy, W. Bentinck, Esq. P. Minchin, Esq. P. D'Auvergne, Prince of Bouillon.

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